Why Personalistic Parties?: The Choice of Candidate-Centered Electoral Systems in New Democracies

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Abstract:

Why do personalistic parties, which are undisciplined and focused on delivering individual/local benefits, flourish in some developing democracies? Many scholars argue that these parties thrive because of candidate-centered electoral rules, which encourage candidates to cultivate personal reputations with constituents instead of party policy reputations. Yet it is seldom obvious why such rules were adopted in the first place. To explain this puzzle, I examine two new democracies in Southeast Asia—the Philippines and Indonesia—and find that politicians sometimes choose candidate-centered electoral rules in order to increase their electoral chances in the first democratic election and to control the new government thereafter. Voter demands, pre-existing electoral rules, and party resources affect which institutional choice is likely to help win the first election. I then test the general applicability of findings drawn from these cases to other emerging democracies. I discover that voter demands for pork, pre-existing candidate-centered electoral rules, and access to government resources lead politicians to choose more permissive electoral rules (favoring candidates who rely on personalistic campaign strategies).

In the Philippines, after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in a "people power" uprising in 1986, the Constitutional Commission deliberated over a new legislative electoral system. After a long discussion about what kind of electoral institutions would be the best for the new democracy, the commission chose to retain the pre-existing electoral system, single-member district plurality rule (hereafter, SMD). The Philippine SMD system, however, is extremely candidate-centered in that neither candidate names nor party labels are printed and voters have to write candidates' names on the ballot. Under the "write-in" or "open" ballot system, party leaders lack control over ballot access and voters need to remember candidate names rather than party labels. Thus, politicians tend to obsess about cultivating personal reputations for delivering individual/local benefits and have little incentive to promote party policy reputations, which has been consistently pointed out as one of the most serious diseases of Philippine democracy (Montinola 1999; Rocamora 1998; Quimpo 2007).

The Philippine case suggests that in new democracies although political leaders' preference is for democracy to be supported by citizens and to survive, those leaders sometimes choose political institutions with perverse consequences. In particular, they may promote electoral rules that induce candidate-centered campaigns, which usually make parties *personalistic* by undermining party discipline and loyalty and spurring pork barrel politics.

Many observers believe that such rules—although electorally useful to those who initiate them in the short run—harm programmatic accountability and government performance, and hence undermine citizen support for democracy in the long run. On the one hand, where a majority of voters want their representatives to provide them with programmatic goods, such as social welfare programs and universal health care, party indiscipline and disloyalty, caused by politicians' need to build personal reputations, reduce the likelihood of such reforms being

passed (Desposato 2006; Chang 2007; Cox and McCubbins 1993). Parties promise to deliver such programs during the campaign. In order for citizens to hold the parties accountable for delivery of promised policies to citizens, it is necessary to have politicians disciplined and loyal to their parties so that they are bound to the party programs (promises). Where politicians often vote against their party lines or switch to other parties, voters have greater difficulty finding reliable representatives who will consistently stand for their interests.

On the other hand, where a majority of voters desire particularistic goods, such as money, food, jobs, and local projects, those benefits may be better provided in a candidate-centered (permissive) electoral system, because candidates tend to strive to deliver more individual/local benefits to constituents in order to increase their electoral chances under electoral institutions that encourage candidates to cultivate their personal reputations (Carey and Shugart 1995).[1] Recent research shows, however, that political particularism harms the government's performance. Since those particularistic goods are distributed to constituents to help politicians build personal reputations, government resources spent on public services (e.g. education) are allocated less efficiently (Hicken and Simmons 2008), and public policies that promote general interests (e.g. health care reform) are blocked by those who advocate narrow interests (O'Dwyer 2006).

The main question I ask, then, is why do political leaders who have a strong interest in stable democracy nevertheless choose electoral rules that most observers believe contribute to inefficiency in governance? To address this question, I examine two new democracies in Southeast Asia—the Philippines and Indonesia—and then test the general applicability of findings drawn from these cases to other emerging democracies. I argue that politicians

[1] There are two types of particularistic goods: individually targeted benefits (patronage), such as money, jobs, and food, and local public goods (pork), such as local projects/policies (Crisp et al. 2004).

sometimes choose candidate-centered electoral rules to increase their electoral chances in the first democratic election, despite the perverse consequences such rules may bring about. Voter demands, pre-existing electoral rules, and party resources affect which institutional choice is likely to help win the first election.

This study will contribute to bridging the gap between the two intellectual traditions that explain the development of personalistic parties: contextualism and institutionalism. The former focuses on the social context in which personalistic parties develop, whereas the latter focuses on the effects of electoral institutions on party development.

On the one hand, the contextualists contend that the voter's socio-economic status largely affects the success of personalistic parties (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Scott 1972). Poor, less educated voters prefer tangible individual or local benefits to national public policies (Scott 1972, 117-8). Thus, in less developed countries or districts where the majority of voters are poor and less educated, personalistic parties, whose members are more likely to vote against party lines and to switch parties in order to provide voters with those particularistic benefits, are more likely to flourish (Desposato 2006).

The institutionalists, on the other hand, claim that electoral rules that induce candidate-centered campaigns spur personalism in party politics (Carey and Shugart 1995). They argue that permissive electoral systems, in which party leaders lack control over ballot access and in which candidates compete against copartisans for voter support, encourage politicians to develop personal reputations with constituents rather than party policy reputations in order to increase their electoral chances. Under more permissive electoral institutions, therefore, it is expected and corroborated with empirical studies that party cohesion in legislative voting is weaker (Carey 2005; Hix 2004), party switching by legislators is more frequent (Chang 2007), and that

politicians tend to strive to deliver pork and patronage (Hicken and Simmons 2008; Crisp et al. 2004) and they are thus more prone to be corrupt (Chang and Golden 2006).

The two traditions, however, are not mutually exclusive since the social context in which personalistic parties develop and the effects of candidate-centered electoral rules interact. For instance, personalistic parties that thrive in poor countries are often bolstered by candidate-centered electoral rules, and these rules may hinder the economic development of the countries by spurring political particularism (pork barrel politics). Nonetheless, there is a missing link between the social context and the institutional effects: it is seldom obvious how these permissive electoral rules were adopted in the first place. In new democracies, electoral institutions are often chosen by the parties who expect certain institutional effects to benefit them in the subsequent elections (Brady and Mo 1992; Geddes 1995; Hsieh 1999; Negretto 2006), and the choice is affected by various factors including unforeseen political situations and institutional settings at the time of the transition to democracy. Thus, candidate-centered electoral rules that foster the development of personalistic parties are often the results of the strategic choice of myopic politicians to increase their electoral chances in the subsequent election. This analysis of the choice of candidate-centered electoral systems in developing democracies, therefore, will fill the missing link between the two intellectual traditions.

A review of the existing literature on electoral system choice follows in the subsequent section. Section 2 analyzes the cases of the Philippines and Indonesia and suggests a number of testable hypotheses. Section 3 tests those hypotheses for 94 new democracies around the world. Section 4 discusses the cross-national study findings and concludes.

1. The Choice of Electoral Systems

Early theories about the choice of electoral systems are based on the experiences of Western European countries, which shifted from majority/plurality rule to proportional representation (PR) in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. After mass enfranchisement, labor parties threatened pre-existing parties by mobilizing the newly emerging working class. Fearing labor party victories in upcoming elections under majority/plurality rules that usually benefit large parties by making it difficult for small parties to gain seats, the traditional parties shifted to PR under which small parties can more easily gain seats (Lijphart 1985; Rokkan 1970). Not all these countries, however, changed their electoral systems. Boix (1999) explores the reasons why some Western European countries facing a rising working class did not adopt PR (e.g. Great Britain). After specifying the conditions under which pre-existing parties would feel enough threat to shift to PR, he concludes that the choice to shift to PR depends on the strength of new labor parties and the "coordinating capacities" of the old parties in the legislature: if the new parties are strong and the old parties are fragmented, a PR system will be adopted; if the new parties are weak or the old parties are united, the pre-existing majority/plurality rules will be maintained (Boix 1999, 621-2).[2]

Electoral system choices in new democracies seem similar to the institutional choices in the Western European context of mass enfranchisement in the sense that new opposition parties emerge during transitions to democracy and they often threaten old authoritarian parties, which would lead us to expect to see more proportional electoral systems where the opposition is strong

[2] The arguments of Rokkan and Boix were challenged by Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007). They contend that a country's shift to PR was affected by the country's economic structure rather than its political configuration: the traditional rightist parties adopted PR where benefits from a consensual government were expected to outweigh the cost of redistributive policies because capital and labor had built a cooperative relationship at the local level, whereas the rightist parties retained a plurality/majority rule to contain the rising labor parties where capital and labor were in an adversarial relationship (Cusack et al. 2007). The argument of Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice was later challenged for inconsistency with historical evidence, however (Kreuzer 2010).

and less proportional ones where previously authoritarian parties remain powerful. The choice of electoral systems in new democracies, however, might be the outcome of a more complicated process than those in the Western European democracies.

Distinctive features in electoral institution choice in emerging democracies have been heavily studied over the last two decades, and most of those studies focus on the role of uncertainty in choosing a new institution in transitional contexts (Andrews and Jackman 2005; Birch 2003; Kaminski 2002; King 2003; Luong 2000; Shvetsova 2003). Parties often lack information about each other's electoral strength prior to the first democratic election, because authoritarians repressed opposition parties and a large number of new opposition parties, including revived pre-authoritarian democratic parties, compete for voter support at the time of democratization. Under such extreme uncertainty, parties sometimes agree on a less restrictive electoral institution, such as a PR or a mixed-member system, in order to minimize the risk of winning no seats at all in a majoritarian system (Benoit 2007). Alternatively, outgoing authoritarians may choose a more restrictive majoritarian system because they mistakenly expect to be dominant in the upcoming election (Geddes 1995).

Most of the existing studies, however, overlook the effects on electoral system choices of significant social context (voter demands) and institutional settings (pre-existing electoral institutions and party resources) that shape politicians' preferences over new electoral systems at the time of transitions to democracy. Examples and details of how each factor influences the institutional choice are presented in the subsequent section, and the test of the arguments for 94 new democracies around the world follows in section 3.

2. Case Studies of Electoral System Choice in New Democracies

Case studies provide the best insights into electoral system choices in new democracies because such institutional choices are usually made through complicated strategic calculations of political leaders at the time of transitions to democracy, and only deep analyses of individual cases can reveal the factors that led to the final choices. I chose the Philippines and Indonesia for the case studies since these countries adopted widely different electoral rules in terms of the permissiveness of institutions despite numerous similarities. In both countries democratic party systems existed prior to authoritarian interludes, authoritarians repressed the old party systems and created new parties to support themselves, the pre-authoritarian democratic parties revived after transitions to democracy, and their economies are at similar levels (e.g. GNI per capita in 2007 is $1,650 for Indonesia and $1,620 for the Philippines). Nonetheless, when these countries democratized, they chose widely different electoral systems: the Philippines adopted a highly candidate-centered system, single-member district plurality rule (first-past-the-post system) with no party ballot control; Indonesia chose a highly party-centered electoral system, closed-list PR.

It would seem that these countries either continued the pre-authoritarian electoral system or chose a very similar one. The Indonesian new electoral system (PR) was the same as its pre-existing electoral system. The Philippine system was somewhat different from its old system (first past the post, FPTP) in that the new one was a mixed-member system (FPTP and PR); the PR portion was, however, insignificant because it took up only 20 percent of the seats in the legislature, and because the PR election was not held until eleven years after the first democratic election. The case studies, however, suggest that (1) voter demands affect what type of electoral institution will benefit politicians in the subsequent election, (2) pre-existing electoral institutions play a large role in politicians' choice of new electoral institutions because politicians from the

old regime tend to model the new system on the old electoral system under which they thrived (Geddes 1995), and (3) whether a party has access to government resources affects the party's institutional preferences.

2.1 The Philippines 1986

On March 24, 1986, after the "People Power Revolution" drove Ferdinand Marcos into exile, the Congress (*Batasan Pambangsa*) declared that Corazon Aquino was the true winner of the earlier presidential election in which Marcos had been granted another six-year term as the President with the help of alleged massive electoral fraud. Incoming president Aquino appointed members of a Constitutional Commission (hereafter, Con-Com) to draft a new constitution that contains provisions for a new legislative electoral system.

When the Con-Com members discussed a new electoral institution, FPTP had been in place for the lower house election since the independence of the republic in 1946.[3] After a long discussion, the commission adopted a mixed-member district system: 80 percent of the members of the House of Representatives would be elected using FPTP and the remaining portion elected using PR. Although provision for a mixed-member system was included in the constitution, the proportion of those elected by PR is only 20 percent, and the first election in which PR was used was 1998, eleven years after the first post-Marcos legislative election (Hicken and Kasuya 2003, 136-37).[4] Hence, in fact the Con-Com chose to retain the pre-existing FPTP for the first decade after the transition to democracy.

[3] A multi-member district system was used for the 1978 election for an interim assembly under Marcos' rule (Hicken and Kasuya 2003)133-34.
[4] Meanwhile, 14 to 21 sectoral representatives were appointed by the president.

2.1.1 Question

The Philippine FPTP is highly candidate-centered (permissive) in that it uses an open ballot system in which voters must write candidate names in the blanks on the ballot.[5] Hence voters need to remember candidate names rather than party labels. Moreover, politicians who lack a party nomination can run as independents, and parties are thus unable to limit access to the ballot. In addition, voters often have difficulty recognizing official party candidates because "parties do not make or announce a list of approved candidates" (Choi 2001, 492), because independents who lack a party nomination sometimes use the party label during electoral campaigns,[6] and because neither candidate names nor party labels are printed on the ballot. Thus, politicians tend to strive to cultivate personal reputations for delivering targeted individual or local benefits to constituents, which has fostered the development of personalistic parties and hence undermined programmatic accountability (Montinola 1999, 133-5).

Scholars and civil rights activists who played a large role in deposing Marcos and drafting the new constitution in Con-Com were well aware of the problems of the pre-existing FPTP system.[7] Hence, the highly candidate-centered electoral institution could have been replaced with a more party-centered one during the transition to democracy; almost the same institution was, however, adopted for the post-Marcos legislative elections. Why did the

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[5] A section for party vote used to be included on the ballot, but it was removed in 1951 (Choi 2001, 492; Montinola 1999, 135). A new standard printed ballot that contains candidate names and party labels was introduced in 2010. Carey and Shugart (1995, 429) labeled the Philippine FPTP as an open endorsement system "in which parties do not control endorsements and thus multiple candidates may compete under the same party label." Most of the time, however, parties nominate a single candidate for each district and only those official party candidates use the party label (Interview with Lambert Ramirez, Executive Director of National Institute for Policy Studies, Makati City, 20 May 2010). Exceptions occur when candidates who fail to get their party endorsements nevertheless use the party label when they run as independents, as for instance, "Liberal Party-Independent" (Interview with Joseph Emil Abaya, Secretary General of Liberal Party, Quezon City, 24 September 2008).

[6] Interview with Antonius C. Umali, Professor, Political Science, Polytechnic University of the Philippines-Manila, Makati City, 10 May 2010.

[7] Interview with Wilfrido V. Villacorta, member of Con-Com (representative from academic sector), Makati City, 25 May 2010; interview with Jose Luis Martin 'Chito' Gascon, member of Con-Com (representative from youth sector), Mandaluyong City, 2 June 2010.

members of Con-Com, who wanted their new democracy to be supported by citizens and to survive, nevertheless choose to retain the old electoral institution that had nurtured personalistic politicians and parties before and during the dictatorship, and might thus undermine citizen support for democracy?

2.1.2 Pork-Oriented Politics and Permissive Electoral System

In the Philippines, wealthy families have long been dominant in local politics (Anderson 1998; Quimpo 2005; Lande 1965; Franco 2001; Hutchcroft 1998; Sidel 1997). In the pre-Marcos era, even though two national parties, Nacionalista and Liberal, competed for legislative seats across the country,

> (the) national parties, rather than being the highly centralized parties of so many new nations, (were) loose federations or alliances among independent factional leaders in the provinces who (held) through familial and other powerful ties a primary claim upon the loyalty of the people of their localities (Lande 1965, 24-5).

Since those local factional leaders were able to mobilize a large number of votes in the regions, the two national parties strived to obtain the support of the bosses in the provinces in order to win elections.[8] To receive and maintain their support, national party leaders had to provide the local leaders with resources for pork and patronage that were necessary to retain the loyalty of the locals, because the majority of the local people were poor and uneducated and they thus desired tangible individual or local benefits (Lande 1965, 79-83). That is, the national leaders

[8] Sidel (1997) calls the local leaders *bosses* to emphasize their coercive powers over the locals. The bosses are usually landowners, creditors, or employers who can demand personal loyalty from the people (tenants, debtors, or employees) using their superior positions.

diverted governmental funds and projects into the hands of the local leaders in exchange for voter support from the region.

Even during the Marcos era, although national leaders of the dictator's party (KBL, *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan*: New Society Movement) relied less on the support of the local bosses for electoral success, most of the local leaders maintained a strong personal support base in the region, and thus the opposition who lacked access to government resources had to count heavily on those bosses in the provinces. Hence, the wealthy local families exert great influence on the post-Marcos politics and national party leaders compete to feed those factional leaders pork and patronage for voter support.

The FPTP system adopted since the independence of the country has suited this patronage politics. Because the candidate who receives the largest number of votes wins in the constituency, FPTP usually benefits politicians who deliver individually or geographically targeted goods to constituents, while harming those who deliver programmatic goods for the broader population of the country (Stratmann and Baur 2002). Hence, in the Philippines, the single-member district electoral rule benefits powerful local leaders who are able to deliver such particularistic goods to constituents with accumulated wealth in the provinces and with government resources from national party leaders.

Under a normal FPTP (with a standard printed ballot), however, difficulties would arise when a multiple number of local leaders seek a party nomination for the same constituency, especially from the president's party, because those who are not nominated may switch to the other party and the party will thus lose a significant amount of votes from the region. To avoid this nomination problem, national party leaders sometimes declare a "free zone" in which "no official party candidate is designated and various candidates are allowed to run under the party

label for the same office" (Lande 1965, 58). The free zone, however, does not solve the problem because it often awards victory to a sole candidate from the other party due to a split in votes among the candidates from the same party (Lande 1965, 58-60).

Although the Philippine write-in ballot system was originally designed to "prevent illiterates from voting" (Montinola 1999, 135), in practice, the electoral institution has helped national party leaders solve the nomination problem. Because the ballot contains only blanks next to the contested positions and because "each candidate is free to make and hand out sample ballots showing where to fill in their names" (Choi 2001), a party endorsement becomes less important. Instead, voters tend to care about candidates' personal reputations rather than party reputations for delivering individual or local benefits, which leads candidates to spend an enormous amount of money during electoral campaigns.[9] Furthermore, once elected, politicians often switch to the president's party or vote with the president in order to access government resources for pork and patronage, due to the significance of personal reputations. Hence, this highly candidate-centered electoral rule also helps the national party leaders to be exempt from financing expensive electoral campaigns of the candidates and the president to gain legislative support from the parliament more easily.[10]

More important, the open ballot system is beneficial to the powerful local factional leaders running for a congressional seat since this permissive rule allows them to be more independent from their national party leaders. Where a party nomination is crucial to electoral success, candidates should be more dependent on their party leaders, which may decrease the

[9] It is roughly estimated that a candidate would need to spend at least ten million US dollars to win a congressional election (Interview with Ramon Casiple, Executive Director of the Institute for Political and Electoral Reform, Quezon City, 22 September 2008).

[10] It is common in Philippine elections that candidates finance their own electoral campaigns even if they are endorsed by their parties (Interview with Gascon). Thus, when party leaders nominate candidates, one of the most important criteria is whether a candidate is capable of running her own electoral campaign (Interview with Ramirez).

amount of largess awarded to the local leaders in exchange for voter support from the region. Hence, although such a candidate-centered electoral rule incurs more campaign spending in the short run, it helps the local leaders obtain more governmental funds and projects (desired by constituents) from national party leaders, which is more profitable in the long run.

In sum, in the Philippines, electoral success of national parties depends on the support of wealthy local factional leaders in the provinces where the majority of voters are poor and thus desire pork and patronage. Hence, the national party leaders and local leaders exchange what they need from each other: pork and votes. The FPTP electoral rule has benefitted the local bosses who are capable of delivering particularistic benefits in the congressional election. Faced with the nomination problem, however, national party leaders find the FPTP with an open ballot useful since the permissive electoral rule makes party labels less noticeable and induces more candidate-centered electoral campaigns. The local leaders also benefit since this rule help them preserve strong influence over the national party leaders.

2.1.3 Institutional Choice by the Constitutional Commission of 1986

When President Aquino appointed the members of the Constitutional Commission, she chose 30 percent (14 out of 47) from among Marcos-era politicians and the rest were representatives from civil society.[11] Among the Marcos-era politicians, four were from the KBL (Marcos' party) and ten were from the opposition; among the civil society representatives, however, about half of them were either closely tied to those politicians or from old political families in the provinces.[12] Thus, in fact those who represented the interest of the pre-existing politicians held a majority of

[11] Interviews with Villacorta and Gascon. They identified the job and background of each Con-Com member during the interviews. Aquino first appointed 50 members, but two from Iglesia ni Cristo refused to take part in Con-Com and one movie director resigned (Interview with Villarcorta).
[12] Interview with Gascon.

Con-Com. Furthermore, provisions for the new legislative electoral system were discussed and drafted in the Committee on the Legislature within Con-Com, and the old politicians dominated the committee: out of 15 committee members, eight were Marcos-era politicians (one from the KBL), two were from local political families, and three were close to those politicians.[13]

As discussed above, since most of those pre-existing politicians were powerful local factional leaders who have maintained personal support bases in the provinces, they preferred to retain the existing FPTP voting rule that had benefitted candidates who delivered particularistic goods to constituents. The open ballot system was especially desirable since it had helped the national party leaders to solve the nomination problem and the local leaders to demand rewards from the national leaders.

When reform-minded Con-Com members who had weak ties to the wealthy families in the provinces proposed a full sectoral representation or PR system, therefore, the committee immediately revised that proposal to a mixed-member district system and cut the proportion of the sectoral or party-list representatives to 20 percent.[14] Eventually, the committee draft was passed by Con-Com where those who preferred the status-quo were also in a majority**.**

In short, after the fall of Marcos, the old-politician-dominated Con-Com chose to retain the pre-existing electoral institution that had benefitted the old politicians before and during Marcos' rule, which contributes to the perpetuation of the country's historical patronage politics.

2.1.4 Hypotheses

The analysis of the choice of a candidate-centered electoral system by the Philippine political leaders suggests two potentially generalizable findings.

[13] Interviews with Villarcorta and Gascon.
[14] Interview with Villarcorta.

Hypothesis 1: We expect to see more candidate-centered electoral institutions in less developed countries where the majority of voters are poor and less educated, since those constituents tend to prefer pork and patronage to national public policies, and politicians may thus want to adopt a permissive electoral system under which they can freely deliver those particularistic benefits to increase electoral chances by switching to the president's party or voting with the president.

Hypothesis 2: where the pre-existing politicians are dominant in the post-authoritarian negotiation over a new electoral system, they tend to model the new institution on the pre-existing electoral institution under which they thrived because they can reasonably expect to do better under an institution similar to the old institution, which leaves their resources and support network intact.

2.2 Indonesia 1998-9

Indonesia is another developing country where the majority of voters are poor and less educated, which would lead us to expect politicians to choose a candidate-centered electoral system after the transition to democracy. Indonesia, however, adopted a highly party-centered electoral system: closed-list PR.

Indonesia is a prime example a new legislative electoral system negotiated by politicians with experience in the prior dictatorship. Many existing studies detail the process of the transitional negotiations (Ziegenhain 2008; Zenzie 1999; Woodward 2002; Crouch 2010; Ellis 2004; Bourchier 2000; King 2003, 47-74). After Suharto stepped down in May 1998 following a series of massive protests, then-vice president Habibie became the president of the interim government and had an expert group, dubbed *Tim Tujuh* (Team of Seven), draft a bill for a new

electoral system for the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*: House of Representatives).[15] The Team of Seven proposed a single-member district plurality voting system (fist past the post, FPTP), which was a drastic revision of the pre-existing closed-list PR system.[16]

Since the new electoral institution was discussed before the legalization of other political parties, only the three pre-existing parties that had been permitted under Suharto's rule—the authoritarian governing party, Golkar (*Partai Golongan Karya*: Party of the Functional Groups); the Islamic opposition party, PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*: United Development Party); and the nationalist opposition PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*: Indonesian Democratic Party)—took part in the negotiations. The PDI, however, was hardly significant in the negotiations because the nationalist party took up only 2.6% of the elected seats in the legislature (DPR). Moreover, the majority faction of PDI led by Megawati Sukarnoputri was banned from participating in the previous election under Suharto's rule and thus existed outside the legislature. Hence, Golkar and PPP were the major actors in the negotiations over the new electoral system.

The government proposal of FPTP was welcomed by the ruling Golkar; the proposal, however, faced stern objections from the PPP, because the opposition party feared that a single-member district electoral system would favor Golkar that had district-based support networks, such as party organizations and bureaucratic agencies, across the country. Instead, the PPP supported PR under which opposition parties that had less organizational support at the district level were expected to gain more seats.

Even though Golkar held a majority of the parliamentary seats, the PPP's threat to boycott the next election made it impossible for the governing party to pass the reform proposed

[15] The expert group was headed by Ryaas Rasyid who was the head of the *Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan* (Institute of Government Studies), the government bureaucracy's largest training school (Woodward 2002).
[16] The actual proposal was a mixed system of FPTP and PR; the PR portion was, however, small (24 percent) enough to be ignorable (King 2003, 60; Interview with Ryaas Rasyid, Jakarta, 24 August 2009).

by the Team of Seven unilaterally. Eventually, as the scheduled election day was approaching, the interim government simply had no choice but to continue using the pre-existing PR system because the government lacked sufficient time to administer the impending election with a new electoral system.

2.2.1 Questions

The extant studies are nevertheless far from satisfactory for explaining the strategic calculations of the party leaders that led to the choice of PR. First, it is believed that the authoritarian Golkar party accepted PR although FPTP was expected to award more seats to the ruling party, which had established nationwide organization and access to government resources, in the upcoming election (Crouch 2010, 5; Woodward 2002, 199). That expectation seems hardly substantiated, however, because the established network was used to distribute resources in a PR system during the Suharto era, and hence Golkar's political machine could have been organized to be used within PR districts for post-Suharto elections. Moreover, had Golkar expected significant benefits under FPTP, it would have continued to support that electoral rule; in fact, however, the Golkar leaders seemed indifferent between FPTP and PR in the negotiations although they welcomed the Team of Seven's proposal of FPTP in the beginning.[17] Instead, the most significant provision that stymied the negotiations was whether civil servants should be allowed to support a political party (Woodward 2002, 237). Why did Golkar first support FPTP and then become unconcerned about whether to choose FPTP or PR once the issue of the political neutrality of civil servants came to be contentious?

Second, the PPP stubbornly pressed for PR because FPTP was expected to benefit the governing Golkar party with the support of the local bureaucratic agencies. The opposition party,

[17] Interview with Ryaas Rasyid, Jakarta, 24 August 2009.

however, rejected FPTP and supported PR even when those bureaucrats were neutralized, which benefitted Golkar since PR awarded the ruling party more seats than FPTP would have done given neutral bureaucracy. Had FPTP been adopted without the support of the bureaucracy, Megawati Sukarnoputri's powerful new party—PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)—would have dominated Golkar in most non-Muslim districts where the secular voters are in the majority.[18] Furthermore, after the fall of Suharto, Islamic groups that had been incorporated into the PPP began to create their own political parties. Because small parties prefer a more proportional system under which they can easily gain seats with a small amount of vote share, the PR system chosen at the end of the negotiations encouraged those new Islamic parties to run for legislative seats under their banners without building a coalition with the PPP, which would have been more difficult under FPTP.[19] Why did the PPP leaders that might have acknowledged the possibility of building a coalition with the new parties under FPTP nevertheless refused the institution and supported a PR system that fueled the fragmentation of the Islamic parties?

2.2.2 Golkar's Dilemma and Strategies

After the fall of Suharto, many observers expected that the authoritarian Golkar party would collapse (Liddle 2000; Tomsa 2008). It thus seems reasonable for Golkar to have supported the pre-existing PR since the authoritarian party was dominant under that electoral system during the Suharto era and since a proportional system tends to award more legislative seats to small parties than a single-member district system does. When the interim government (Team of Seven)

[18] Interview with Senior Adviser of UNPD Indonesia, Peter Raymond Evans, Jakarta, 4 September 2008.
[19] Ryaas Rasyid claims that had FPTP been adopted, those Islamic groups would have remained in the PPP (Interview, Jakarta, 31 August 2009). Those groups, however, had already established their own political parties before the new electoral law was passed in January 1999. Hence it should be more appropriate to assume that those small new parties were highly likely to build a coalition with or to merge with the PPP under the FPTP system.

proposed FPTP, however, Golkar supported the proposal because the ruling party expected to increase its electoral chances by delivering targeted goods to voters in single-member districts.

Where voters desire pork and patronage, the ruling party that has access to government resources should have great advantage over the opposition that lacks such resources for elections. Furthermore, that electoral advantage normally increases as the district magnitude, the number of representatives elected from a constituency, decreases, since representatives who deliver specific benefits to a narrower population benefit more from a smaller district magnitude (Lancaster 1986). For instance, where the majority of voters desire particularistic goods and 20 representatives are elected from that district, some opposition party candidates who represent minority constituents who desire programmatic goods are more likely to win legislative seats than where the district magnitude is two. The governing party is thus able to maximize its seat gains from single-member districts in each of which the majority of voters prefer to receive government largess. Hence, in Indonesia, where most parts of the country are less developed, it is reasonable for the ruling Golkar that was expected to fall after the ousting of Suharto to embrace the reform of the pre-existing PR toward a single-member district electoral system.

To deliver individually or locally targeted benefits to constituents more efficiently, however, it was essential for Golkar to mobilize support from local bureaucratic agencies. Since all civil servants had been official members of the authoritarian party and constituted party machines at the district level (Crouch 2010; Tomsa 2008), those local bureaucrats knew *to whom* and *how* to deliver such particularistic benefits in the provinces, and Golkar was thus hardly sure that single-member districts would secure electoral gain without the support of the bureaucracy. Hence, when Akbar Tanjung, then-state secretary and chairman of Golkar, found a provision in the proposal of the Team of Seven that would ban civil servants from supporting a political party,

he kept the drafts of new political laws in his state secretary office and held up submitting the bills to the legislature for two months (Woodward 2002, 237-8).[20]

Of course, the opposition supported the provision of the political neutrality of civil servants, while the governing Golkar vigorously rejected it, which drove the negotiations to hit a roadblock. To remove the obstruction, Golkar accepted PR, which was easy because many Golkar leaders also "feared the loss of power that would occur if they could no longer determine the order of candidates in closed party lists" under FPTP (King 2003, 61). The ruling party, however, suggested a PR system at the district level (*kabupaten* and municipalities) instead of the pre-existing PR at the provincial level under which each of 27 provinces serves as a constituency.[21] The opposition immediately rejected the Golkar's proposal since it contains 260 single-member districts out of 314 constituencies (Crouch 2010, 49). Golkar was indeed desperate to adopt a single-member district electoral system while retaining the support of the bureaucracy, and the governing party abandoned the proposal of district-level PR only after civil servants were finally neutralized by PPP's threat to boycott the election. The interim president Habibie accepted the provision of a neutral bureaucracy on 27 January 1999, the day before the deadline to pass the bills to hold a general election in June 1999, fearing public unsettlement upon a postponement of the scheduled election (Woodward 2002, 240-1).

After Habibie agreed to ban civil servants from supporting a political party, Golkar acquiesced to the province-level PR demanded by the opposition. Many observers argue that this was because the authoritarians did not want to delay the June election (Crouch 2010; Woodward 2002). Given neutralization of the bureaucracy, however, Golkar should have expected to benefit from PR. Uncertainty about electoral outcomes in the subsequent election

[20] In addition to the law on electoral system, the other political laws drafted by the Team of Seven were on political parties and the legislature.
[21] *Kabupaten* is an administrative division one level below *provinsi* (province).

increased with the political neutrality of local bureaucrats. Especially under the extreme uncertainty with the emergence of the powerful PDI-P party, Golkar reasoned that a proportional electoral institution (with a large district magnitude) would minimize its risk of losing all seats in the legislature. Furthermore, Golkar reasonably expected the old electoral system to benefit them in the upcoming election because the authoritarian party still maintained province-level party organizations and networks that helped them dominate the opposition throughout the Suharto era.

Golkar seemed indifferent between FPTP and PR in the transitional negotiations over a new electoral system because the ruling party focused on the civil servant issue and supported a district-level PR during the negotiations then finally accepted a province-level PR with little objection. Nonetheless, in fact the district-level PR was similar to a single-member district system. Hence it would be more reasonable to assume that Golkar preferred FPTP with a supportive bureaucracy but opted for the pre-existing PR given a neutral bureaucracy.

2.2.3 PPP's Choice

The opposition Islamic PPP consistently opposed FPTP and supported PR because the single-member district system was presumed to benefit the ruling Golkar. Furthermore, the existing closed-list PR contributed to the party leaders' tight control over rank-and-file party members because the leaders determine candidates' ranks on the party list (King 2003, 61). Once the provision of the political neutrality of the bureaucracy was accepted, however, the proportional electoral system turned out to benefit Golkar since it prevented the authoritarian party from being dominated by Megawati's new nationalist party in non-Muslim districts and since it contributed to the fragmentation of the Islamic parties. It would seem that the PPP leaders gave more weight

to the control over the rank and file than to its seat share in the legislature.[22] Nonetheless, uncertainty also played a large role in shaping the opposition leaders' institutional preference.

After the fall of Suharto, while the Suharto-era parties negotiated the transition to democracy, opposition groups that had been banned or incorporated into the tame opposition parties rose to build new parties. Notable are four parties: PDI-P, created by Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of former president Sukarno; PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*: National Awakening Party) formed by NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*), the largest Islamic group based on East Java; PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional*: National Mandate Party) founded by *Muhammadiyah*, the second largest Islamic group; and PBB (*Partai Bulan Bintang*: Crescent Star Party) instituted by supporters of *Masyumi*, a pre-Suharto Islamic party.

Table 1 shows that the seat gain for each party would have differed depending on the type of electoral system given neutral bureaucracy. The first column indicates the actual election results under PR and the second column is the projected seat gains under FPTP. I simulate the electoral outcomes based on the actual vote share of each party at the *kabupaten* (constituency) level.[23] Had FPTP been adopted, the powerful PDI-P would have been dominant in parliament by gaining 314 out of 500 seats (38 seats were reserved for the military), the seat share of Golkar would have decreased from 120 to 94, that of PPP from 58 to 16, and two new small Islamic parties, PAN and PBB, could have hardly entered the parliament. Hence, the PPP could have built a coalition or merged with smaller Islamist new parties under FPTP.[24] It is thus more likely that, had FPTP been adopted, the seat share of Golkar would have decreased to 74 and that of

[22] Interview with Ryaas Rasyid, 24 August 2009.
[23] To simulate the election results under FPTP, I assume that each *kabupaten* is a congressional district and give weight in proportion to the number of votes casted in the *kabupaten*.
[24] Interview with Ryaas Rasyid, Jakarta, 31 August 2009.

PPP would have increased to 65 with the support from PAN and PBB (see the third column).[25] It may seem irrational for the PPP to reject FPTP and support PR after civil servants were neutralized.

[Table 1 about here]

Had the PPP opted for FPTP, the chances of small Islamic parties, including PAN and PBB, to build a coalition or merge with PPP would have been indeed higher. It was still possible, however, that those small parties would remain independent of each other. Especially because PAN and PBB were built on the deep-rooted Islamic group *Muhammadiyah* and historical *Masyumi* party respectively, the party members might oppose supporting PPP even when the parties expected to fail to gain any seats under FPTP. Moreover, even if PPP had acquired the support of PAN and PBB under FPTP, PPP's expected seat share would have increased slightly (see Table 1). In addition, the emergence of the powerful nationalist PDI-P with the unprecedented neutral bureaucracy raised the uncertainty about PPP's electoral chances in the upcoming election.

In short, the PPP leaders might have preferred to opt for FPTP at the expense of tight control over the party members under closed-list PR, if they had been almost certain that PAN and PBB would support PPP and expected a significant gain in the party's seat share under the single-member district electoral system. Nonetheless, the opposition leaders were uncertain about the chance of the Islamic parties to coalesce and expected a slightly larger seat share at best under FPTP. Furthermore, unforeseen political configuration increased the risk of obtaining

[25] The PKB would have been reluctant to build a coalition with PPP since it could have survived under FPTP because of a strong support base in East Java. I disregard the PDI and 41 other small parties because it is hard to tell which big parties they would have supported under FPTP, and because the vote shares of the parties range from .04 to 1.36 percent and thus hardly affect the electoral outcomes.

no seats at all in the upcoming election under the plurality rule. The PPP thus opposed Golkar's district-level PR that is similar to FPTP, and instead chose the more proportional province-level PR that was presumed to minimize the risk of extinction and to help the party leaders maintain tight control over the rank and file.

2.2.4 Summary and Hypothesis

In Indonesia where the majority of voters are poor and less educated and thus desire pork and patronage, the authoritarian Golkar preferred a single-member district system under which the ruling party expected to maximize the effects of government resources on electoral gains. When it became impossible to mobilize local bureaucrats, however, Golkar accepted the pre-existing PR system under which the party was dominant during the past authoritarian regime. On the other hand, faced with extreme uncertainty about electoral chances in the upcoming election, the pre-existing opposition party PPP also preferred the status quo since it could survive under that system regardless of what might happen in the future.

The analysis of the strategic calculations of those Indonesian political leaders that led to the final choice of PR suggests another testable argument.

Hypothesis 3: Where incumbent governing parties are dominant in the negotiations over new electoral systems in less developed countries, they tend to choose a single-member district system under which they can maximize the effects of government resources on vote gains by delivering pork and patronage to targeted areas and individuals.

3. Cross-National Studies of Electoral System Choice in New Democracies

This study includes all new democracies since 1950 to test the proposed hypotheses about the conditions under which more (or less) candidate-centered electoral institutions are chosen at the time of the transition to democracy. I use the classification of regime type in the dataset used in Cheibub et al. (2009) to determine whether a country is a democracy or not.[26] According to them, a country is democratic if its effective executive is directly elected or selected by an elected assembly (or electoral college), a legislature with multiple parties is elected, and opposition parties or challengers to incumbents are allowed and have realistic chances of taking power. Among the countries that are coded as democracy in 2008, the most recent year in the Cheibub et al. dataset, 94 countries that have experienced an authoritarian interlude since 1950 are identified as new democracies.[27] The 94 new democracies in the dataset are listed in Table 2.

[Table 2 about here]

The dependent variable is the extent to which an electoral institution spurs personalism in party politics. Several ways of measuring this have been suggested. Carey and Shugart (1995) measure how much "incentive to cultivate a personal reputation" an electoral rule offers. They code electoral rules according to voting and pooling methods, and party leaders' control over access to ballot: the more votes voters cast for candidates over parties, the less votes are pooled across whole party, and the less ballot control party leaders have, the more candidate-centered

[26] It is an updated and revised version of the dataset of Przeworski et al. (2000).

[27] Thus, among the democracies in 2008, I exclude developed democracies in Western Europe and North America and newly independent states that had not experienced an indigenous authoritarian regime due to the direct rule of foreign powers, such as Andorra and the Bahamas, from the dataset. Among newly independent states, however, ex-communist democracies, such as Armenia and Estonia, are included, since they had experienced authoritarian regimes ruled by domestic communist parties until independence, and hence the context in which they choose new institutions during their transitions was similar to that of other non-newly independent post-communist countries, such as Hungary and Poland.

campaigns politicians tend to run to compete against copartisans for voter support. Their coding scheme is as follows.

Ballot

0	Leaders present a fixed ballot, voters may not disturb list
1	Leaders present party ballots, but voters may disturb list
2	Leaders do not control access to ballots, or rank

Pool

0	Pooling across whole party
1	Pooling at sub-party level
2	No pooling

Votes

0	Voters cast a single vote for one party
1	Voters cast votes for multiple candidates
2	Voters cast a single vote below the party level

Hence, for instance, closed-list PR where voters cast a single vote for a fixed party list is coded 0 for *ballot*, 0 for *pool*, and 0 for *votes*; the open-list PR where voters cast a single vote for one candidate on a party list is coded 1 for *Ballot*, 0 for *Pool*, and 2 for *Votes*. Thus, more candidate-centered electoral institutions tend to receive a higher number. Carey and Shugart (1995, 425) then rank a variety of electoral institutions 1^{st} to 13^{th} (where 13^{th} is the most candidate-centered) according to the codes.

The ranking system of Carey and Shugart, however, has two critical shortcomings. First, single-member district plurality rule with ballot control by party leaders (hereafter, SMD) is deemed the most party-centered (ranked first along with closed-list PR: *Ballot*=0, *Pool*=0, *Votes*=0) on the assumption that voters cast a vote for a party rather than for a candidate under the rule. The assumption, however, is hard to substantiate since whether voters vote for a party or a candidate under SMD often depends on political context of the country. In developed

democracies where major parties are well established, such as the United Kingdom, party labels play a large role in garnering votes, while in developing democracies where party systems are still fluid, voters are more likely to choose a candidate over a party.[28] Moreover, a candidate's personal attributes play a larger role in increasing her electoral chances under a SMD, while party popularity and a candidate's rank on the party list have more effect on her chances under a closed-list PR; hence, candidates under a SMD should have more incentives to cultivate a personal vote than those under a closed-list PR.

Johnson and Wallack (2006, 8-11), in contrast, ranked most SMD systems 10th in their scoring system, assuming that party leaders lack control over access to ballots because independent candidates are allowed or primaries are used to select candidates (*Ballot*=2), that there is no pooling of votes across candidates from the same party (*Pool*=2), and that it is hard to distinguish votes for a party from those for a candidate (*Votes*=1) under SMD. Their coding scheme also seems problematic, however, in that using primaries to select party candidates should spur more personalism in party politics than allowing independent candidates does. Where party leaders nominate candidates, rank-and-file party members are highly likely to be loyal to their leaders even if independent candidacy is allowed, since electoral chances of independent candidates are lower than those of party members because independents usually have fewer resources for running an electoral campaign than those supported by party organizations.

I use a slightly revised version of the Johnson and Wallack coding scheme. I differentiate SMD with independents allowed from SMD with primaries by coding the former 1 for *Ballot*. SMD with no independents allowed is coded 0 for *Ballot*. In addition, SMD with run-offs (absolute majority rule or majority for first round and plurality for second round) is coded in the

[28] For a detailed discussion about fluid party systems in new democracies, see Roberts and Wibbels (1999).

same way as is SMD plurality.[29]

The second problem with the Carey and Shugart's scoring system is that their decisions on ranking are somewhat arbitrary. For instance, they rank primary systems higher (more party-centered) than single non-transferable vote systems (SNTV) because "there is neither vote pooling nor the possibility of more than one candidate sharing support from the same voter" under the latter (Carey and Shugart 1995, 429).[30] A candidate in primaries, however, also competes against her copartisans and cannot share voter support with others. Hence, I use the average of codes for *Ballot*, *Pool*, and *Votes* for my measure of how candidate-centered (permissive) an electoral institution is. Table 3 shows the types of electoral systems and the permissiveness scores (averages of the codes) used in this study.

[Table 3 about here]

Then, for mixed-member systems that combine majoritarian and PR systems, I give weight to the codes in proportion to the number of legislators elected under each rule. A country, for example, uses SNTV (*Ballo*t=1, *Pool*=2, *Votes*=2) to elect 50 legislators and closed-list PR (*Ballot*=0, *Pool*=0, *Votes*=0) for the other 50, the country's permissiveness score is .83 (*Ballot*=.5, *Pool*=1, *Votes*=1). Decimals are rounded to the hundredth place, and the permissiveness score has 19 different values for the 94 new democracies in my dataset. Nevertheless, although electoral institutions with a higher permissiveness score can be deemed more candidate-centered, the distances between different values of permissiveness score are

[29] Carey and Shugart (1995, 426) consider the SMD run-off more candidate-centered than SMD plurality (FPTP) in that candidates may have greater incentives to cultivate personal reputations to appeal beyond party support base in the second round. Nonetheless, it could be that since candidates in the second round need broad support, they become more loyal to their party leaders because the leaders can help the rank-and-file party members increase electoral chances by building a coalition with other parties.

[30] Under SNTV parties can nominate multiple candidates for each multi-member district, each voter casts one vote for one candidate, and the candidates who receive the most votes win office.

unknown. For example, the permissiveness score for closed-list PR is 0, that for Chile's open-list PR is 1, and that for Colombia's personal-list PR is 1.67. The Colombian PR can thus be considered more candidate-centered than Chile's open-list PR, and the Chilean institution more candidate-centered than closed-list PR; it can hardly be assumed, however, that the Colombian system is 67 percent more permissive than the Chilean system, compared to closed-list PR. Hence, even though the measure, following Shugart and Carey (1995), provides a numeric score, I use the ordinal rankings of the numbers instead. Table 4 presents the ordinal rankings of the permissiveness score for the countries in this study.

[Table 4 about here]

Since the dependent variable is ordinal, this study uses an ordered logit regression model to test the effects of various independent variables on the permissiveness of electoral institutions chosen at the time of the transition to democracy (Long and Freese 2006).

Voter Demands

In order to test the voter demands hypotheses (**Hypothesis 1**), log of GDP per capita (*log-gdp*; base 10) is used to measure the average voter's socio-economic status when political leaders choose a new electoral system. I use Real GDP per Capita (2005 constant prices: Chain series) from the Penn World Table for the year the rules were written.

Pre-existing Electoral Institutions

To test **Hypotheses 2 and 3**, I first identify the participants in the post-authoritarian negotiations

for each country.[31] Electoral rules for the first democratic elections were negotiated either at constituent assemblies called to rewrite constitutions or at a conference or roundtable of representatives of prominent political parties and groups. In addition, there are countries that have old legislatures form working groups to write new electoral laws. I gather information about leading parties in these constitutional assemblies, conferences, roundtables, and legislative working groups. I use three dummies (*authoritarian*, *pre-authoritarian*, and *incumbent*) to identify the cases where authoritarian, pre-authoritarian democratic, or incumbent governing parties are dominant players. *authoritarian* is coded 1 if authoritarians control the process of transitions to democracy (0 otherwise); *pre-authoritarian* is coded 1 if authoritarians were ousted and pre-authoritarian democratic parties are dominant (0 otherwise); *incumbent* is coded 1 if leading actors are governing parties (0 otherwise). Since the single-member district system is a permissive electoral rule (see Table 4), I expect *incumbent* to be positively correlated with the permissive score (**Hypothesis 3**).

Then, I classify the pre-existing electoral systems into four groups: majoritarian, closed-list PR, open-list PR, and mixed-member systems. I use a dummy for each type in each period. For instance, *majoritarian0* is coded 1 for majoritarian systems before authoritarian interlude (0 otherwise), and *majoritarian1* coded 1 for majoritarian systems during authoritarian regime.

Finally, for **Hypothesis 2**, *autho-majoritarian1*, *autho-closedPR1*, *autho-openPR1*, and *autho-mixed1* are generated by having dummies for the type of authoritarian institutions (*majoritarian1*, *closesPR1*, *openPR1, mixed1*) interacted with the dummy for authoritarian dominance in the transitional negotiations over new electoral institutions (*autho*); dummies for

[31] I assume that all participating parties in the negotiations are dominant players since, most of the time, agreements from all the participants are necessary to adopt a new electoral system during democratization (Brady and Mo 1992; King 2003, Benoit 2007). In other words, all the parties in the transitional negotiations are assumed to be *veto players* (Tsebelis 2002).

the type of pre-authoritarian democratic electoral systems (*majoritarian0*, *closedPR0*, *openPR0*, *mixed0*) are interacted with the dummy variable for the dominance of old democratic parties (*pre*), which generates four interaction variables: *pre-majoritarian0*, *pre-closedPR0*, *pre-openPR0*, and *pre-mixed0*. Since majoritarian, open-list PR, and mixed-member systems are more candidate-centered than closed-list PR, I expect *pre-majoritarian0*, *pre-openPR0*, *pre-mixed0*, *autho-majoritarian1*, *autho-openPR1*, and *autho-mixed1* to be positively, and *pre-closedPR0* and *pre-closedPR1* to be negatively, correlated with the permissiveness ranking, which means that where authoritarians are dominant, electoral institutions that are similar to the pre-existing authoritarian electoral rules are likely to be chosen, and that where pre-authoritarian democratic parties are dominant, the old democratic electoral systems are likely to be chosen.

Controls

Not all countries held elections during the authoritarian regime or during earlier democratic periods. Countries without prior electoral experience obviously lack pre-existing electoral institutions on which political leaders can model new institutions. Thus prior electoral experience also needs to be included in the analysis. I use two dummy variables: *pre-elect* is coded 1 if a democratic electoral system before the authoritarian interlude existed (0 otherwise); *autho-elect* is coded 1 if the authoritarian regime held elections (0 otherwise).[32] Forty-five out of 94 countries in my dataset held democratic elections before authoritarian interludes, and 35 out of 94 held elections during the authoritarian regime. Fourteen countries held elections in both periods, while 28 had held no elections before the transition to democracy.

[32] Authoritarian electoral institutions for uncontested elections, where only one candidate endorsed by the authoritarian regime is allowed to run for legislative seat in each constituency, are excluded because no politicians would think that such institutions are viable alternatives for the fully contested election after the transition to democracy.

Second, civil wars sometimes lead authoritarian regimes to collapse. If a democratic election follows a civil war, political leaders may want to deter factionalism within the country, which would result in a less permissive electoral rule that encourages politicians to focus on delivering national public policies rather than individual/local benefits. I thus use a dummy for civil war: *cwar* is coded 1 for the countries where a civil war leads to the transition to democracy, and 0 otherwise. Eleven out of 94 countries are coded 1.

Third, electoral institutions of colonial powers may affect the choice of electoral systems in newly independent countries. For instance, former British colonies may tend to adopt single-member district systems that are similar to the British electoral rule following independence, and hence those countries would be ranked higher on the permissiveness ranking system than others. Thus, I include four dummies (*british*, *french*, *dutch*, and *belgian*) for former colonizers, each of which is coded 1 for its past colonies, and 0 otherwise.[33]

Finally, dummies for world regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, Mediterranean Europe, and Post-Communist Eastern Europe) are included to control for possible imitation or learning from the experiences of neighbors. Moreover, with the area dummies we can control unknown time-invariant region-specific factors that might affect the choice of new electoral systems at the time of the transition to democracy.

[Table 5 about here]

Table 5 summarizes the results of the ordered logit regression model. *log-gdp* has expected and substantial effects on the permissiveness rank. As a country's GDP per capita increases, the probability of the political leaders to choose a more candidate-centered (permissive)

[33] I exclude dummies for former colonies of Portugal, Spain, Germany, and Japan, since those colonial powers did not hold democratic elections when their colonies achieved independence.

electoral institution decreases, holding all other variables constant. The effects are also large: for one unit increase in *log-gdp*, a country is ten times less likely to choose an electoral institution that is one category higher on the permissiveness ranking system (see Table 4), all else being equal.[34] For example, the probability that political leaders in a country with GDP per capita of $1,000, to choose a next more candidate-centered electoral system in the ordered ranking system is ten times greater than that of the leaders in a richer country, GDP per capita of which is $10,000, all else equal. In addition, as the average voter's economic condition improves, the probability of the country to adopt the least permissive electoral system, closed-list proportional representation, increases (see Figure 1.1), while the probability to adopt a highly permissive single-member district majoritarian system tends to decrease (see Figure 1.2), all else being equal.[35] For instance, the expected probability of a poor state (GDP per capita $1,000) to choose closed-list PR is .10, whereas that of a richer state (GDP per capita $10,000) is .50. Conversely, the expected probability of the poor country to select a single-member district majoritarian rule is .34, while that of the richer country is .06, all else equal.

[Figure 1.1 about here]

[Figure 1.2 about here]

The pre-existing electoral institutions also have expected effects. (1) *pre-closePR0* has negative effects, while *pre-majoritarian0* and *pre-openPR0* have positive effects on the permissiveness ranking,[36] meaning that where pre-authoritarian democratic parties are dominant,

[34] $e^{-2.27} = .1 \rightarrow \frac{1}{.1} = 10$

[35] The relationship of the latter is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, however.

[36] The effects of *pre-majoritarian0* and *pre-closedPR0* are not statistically significant.

it is highly likely that the old electoral systems are reintroduced.[37] (2) *autho-majoritarian1*, *autho-openPR1*, and *autho-mixed1* also have positive effects on the permissiveness score, which means where authoritarians are dominant, those authoritarian leaders are highly likely to choose new electoral systems that resemble the pre-existing authoritarian institutions.[38] (3) *incumbent* has an expected effect on the permissiveness score: where incoming presidents or incumbent governing parties lead the negotiations over a new electoral institution, they tend to choose a more candidate-centered electoral institution, such as district-based majoritarian electoral institution.[39]

In order to confirm the effects of those independent variables on the choice of permissive electoral systems, a likelihood-ratio test (LR test) is performed by comparing the log likelihood from a full model with that of a constrained model without the independent variables.[40] The LR test generates a chi-square of 26.1 ($df = 8$, $p < .01$), which means that the effect of my independent variables on the permissiveness of electoral systems chosen at the time of the transition to democracy is significant at the .01 level.

Finally, the ordered logit regression model assumes that the slope coefficients are identical across all response categories (*proportional odds assumption*). An approximate LR test of proportionality of odds confirms that the assumption is not violated.[41]

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[37] *pre-mixedPR0* is omitted because one observation with *pre-mixedPR0*=1 is completely determined, which means the country, where pre-authoritarian democratic parties were dominant and where the old electoral institution was a mixed-member system, adopted the mixed-member system after the transition to democracy.

[38] *autho-closedPR0* is omitted because all four observations with *autho-closedPR0*=1 are completely determined, which means all four countries, where authoritarians were dominant and where the pre-existing authoritarian electoral institutions were closed-list PR, adopted the closed-list PR after transitions to democracy.

[39] The probability of the countries in which incoming presidents' parties dominate negotiations to choose a next more candidate-centered electoral system in the ordered ranking system is three times greater than that of the others, all else equal.

[40] It is assumed that the constrained model is nested in the full model.

[41] The null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same across response categories is not rejected (Chi-square = 220.9, $df = 264$, $p > .9$).

4. Conclusion

This article explains why some new democracies adopted candidate-centered electoral institutions that foster personalistic parties, members of which are less disciplined and loyal to their parties in order to deliver individual/local benefits to constituents, during transitions to democracy. The findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the richer the average voter, the less likely a candidate-centered electoral institution is to be adopted. Second, where authoritarians remained powerful and led the post-authoritarian negotiations over new electoral institutions, institutions similar to those used during authoritarian rule were likely to be continued. Third, where pre-authoritarian democratic parties revived and led the post-authoritarian negotiations, the pre-authoritarian electoral rules were likely to be reintroduced. Finally, where incoming presidents or governing parties led the negotiations, more candidate-centered majoritarian electoral institutions were more likely to be adopted.

These findings indicate that the primary goal of political leaders at the time of the transition to democracy is to win the first democratic election in order to control the new government. Consequently, they choose institutions that help them to respond to voter demands and that perpetuate whatever advantages they had under earlier electoral rules. Sometimes such strategic choice by political leaders results in candidate-centered electoral systems that undermine party discipline and loyalty and spur pork barrel politics; in other times, however, it results in party-centered electoral systems, which deter personalism in party politics, even in less developed countries where the majority of voters are poor and assumed to desire pork, and where we would thus have expected to see permissive electoral rules. This discovery distinguishes this project from other studies of personalist parties, noting that neither voter demands nor electoral institutions are sufficient to explain the development of personalist parties.

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Table 1. Seat Shares under Different Electoral Systems given Neutral Bureaucracy

	Parties	PR	FPTP	FPTP w/ coalition
	Golkar	120	94	74
Old	PPP	58	16	65
	PDI	2	0	NA
	PDI-P	154	314	288
	PKB	51	35	35
New	PAN	35	3	(PPP)
	PBB	14	0	(PPP)
	41 Others	28	0	NA
	Total	462	462	462

Source: Indonesian Election Data from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

Table 2. List of New Democracies

Region (no. of countries)	Country	Authoritarian Regime[a]	First Post-Authoritarian Legislative Election[b]
Sub-Saharan Africa (29)	Benin	1972-91	Feb 17, 1991
	Burundi (1)	1987-93	Jun 29, 1993
	Burundi (2)	1996-2005	Jul 4, 2005
	Cape Verde	1975-90	Jan 13, 1991
	Central Africa	1981-93	Aug 22, Sep 19, 1993
	Comoros (1)	1975-92	Nov 22, 29, 1992
	Comoros (2)	1999-2004	Apr 18, 25, 2004
	Congo (Brazzaville)	1968-92	Jun 24, Jul 19, 1992
	Ghana (1)	1966-69	Aug 29, 1969
	Ghana (2)	1972-79	Jun 18, 1979
	Ghana (3)	1981-92	Dec 29, 1992
	Guinea-Bissau	1980-99	Nov 28, 1999
	Kenya	1963-97	Dec 29, 1997
	Liberia	1997-2005	Oct 11, 2005
	Madagascar	1975-93	Jun 16, 1993
	Malawi	1964-94	May 17, 1994
	Mali	1968-92	Feb 23, Mar 8, 1992
	Mauritania	2005-06	Nov 19, Dec 3, 2006
	Niger (1)	1974-93	Feb 14, 1993
	Niger (2)	1996-99	Nov 24, 1999
	Nigeria (1)	1966-79	Jul 14, 1979
	Nigeria (2)	1993-99	Feb 20, 1999
	Sao Tome and Principe	1975-91	Jan 20, 1991
	Senegal	1960-2000	Apr 29, 2001
	Sierra Leone (1)	1992-96	Feb 26, 1996
	Sierra Leone (2)	1997-98	May 14, 2002
	Sudan (1)	1958-64	Mar, 1965
	Sudan (2)	1969-85	Apr 1, 1986
	Uganda	1971-79	Dec 10, 1980
Asia (18)	Bangladesh	1982-86	May 7, 1986
	Bhutan	1972-2007	Mar 24, 2008
	Burma/Myanma	1948-58	Feb 06, 1960
	Indonesia	1966-99	Jun 7, 1999
	Maldives	1978-2008	May 9, 2009
	Mongolia	1921-90	Jul 29, 1990
	Nepal1	1951-91	May 12, 1991
	Nepal2	2002-06	Apr 10, 2008
	Pakistan	1999-2008	Feb 18, 2008
	Philippines	1972-86	May 11, 1987
	South Korea (1)	1948-60	Jul 29, 1960
	South Korea (2)	1980-87	Apr 26, 1988
	Sri Lanka	1978-88	Feb 15, 1989
	Taiwan	1949-92	Dec 19, 1992
	Thailand (1)	1947-73	Jan 26, 1975
	Thailand (2)	1976-78	Apr 22, 1979
	Thailand (3)	1991-92	Mar 22, 1992
	Thailand (4)	2006-07	Dec 23, 2007

Latin America (26)	Argentina (1)	1955-58	Feb 23, 1958
	Argentina (2)	1962-63	Jul 7, 1963
	Argentina (3)	1966-73	Mar 11, 1973
	Argentina (4)	1976-83	Oct 30, 1983
	Bolivia (1)	1971-79	Jul 1, 1979
	Bolivia (2)	1980-82	Jul 14, 1985
	Brazil	1964-82	Nov 15, 1982
	Chile	1973-89	Dec 14, 1989
	Colombia	1953-58	Mar 16, 1958
	Dominican Republic	1963-65	Jun 1, 1966
	Ecuador	1972-79[c]	Apr 29, 1979
	El Salvador	1948-84	Mar 31, 1985
	Grenada	1979-84	Dec 8, 1984
	Guatemala (1)	1954-58	Jan 19, 1958
	Guatemala (2)	1963-66	Mar 6, 1966
	Guatemala (3)	1982-85	Nov 3, 1985
	Honduras	1972-81[d]	Nov 29, 1981
	Mexico	1917-2000	Jul 2, 2000
	Nicaragua	1979-84	Nov 4, 1984
	Panama	1982-89	May 7, 1989[e]
	Paraguay	1954-89	May 1, 1989
	Peru	1992-2000[f]	Apr 8, 2001
	Suriname (1)	1980-87	Nov 25, 1987
	Suriname (2)	1990-91	May 25, 1991
	Uruguay	1973-84	Nov 25, 1984
	Venezuela	1948-58	Nov 14, 1958
Southern Europe (5)	Greece	1967-74	Nov 17, 1974
	Portugal	1928-74	Apr 25, 1976
	Spain	1939-75	Jun 15, 1977
	Turkey (1)	1957-60	Oct 15, 1961
	Turkey (2)	1980-83	Nov 6, 1983
Eastern Europe/Post-communist countries (15)	Albania	1944-91	Mar 31, Apr 7, 14, 1991
	Armenia	1920-90[g]	May 20, Jun 3, 1990
	Bulgaria	1944-90	Jun 10, 17, 1990
	Czechoslovakia[h]	1948-89	Jun 8-9, 1990
	Estonia	1944-90[i]	Mar 18, 1990
	Georgia	1991-2004	Mar 28, 2004
	Hungrary	1948-90	Mar 25, Apr 8, 1990
	Latvia	1940-90[j]	Mar 18, 25, 1990
	Lithuania	1940-90[k]	Feb 24, Mar 4, 1990
	Macedonia	1943-90[l]	Nov 11, 25, 1990
	Moldova	1940-91[m]	Feb, Mar 1990
	Poland	1944-89	Oct 27, 1991[n]
	Romania	1945-89	May 20, 1990
	Ukraine	1919-91[o]	Mar 27, Apr 3, 1994[p]
	Yugoslavia[q]	1945-2000	Sep 24, 2000
Oceania (1)	Fiji	1987-92	Jul 17, 1992

Note: a. For the countries that have experienced more than one authoritarian regimes before transitions to democracy, only the latest one is counted.
b. Legislative elections for lower houses only.
c. According to Cheibub et al. (2009), there was an authoritarian interlude 2000-01. I, however, removed this case

because only the president was ousted after a people's uprising and the vice-president was approved as president by the legislature. Presidential and legislative elections were held as scheduled in 2002.
d. The previous authoritarian regime (1933-56) is omitted due to the lack of data about the democratic electoral system chosen at the end of the regime.
e. The May election results were reinstated in December 1989.
f. The previous authoritarian regimes (1948-56, 1962-63, and 1968-80) are omitted due to the lack of data about the democratic electoral systems chosen at the end of the regimes.
g. Before independence; Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.
h. Later split into Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993
i. Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.
j. Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.
k. Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.
l. Socialist Republic of Macedonia.
m. Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.
n. The previous election held in June 1989 was not democratic because 65% of the seats were reserved for Communists.
o. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
p. The previous election held in March 1990 was not free. The first free election was the presidential election held in December 1991 following independence from the Soviet Union.
q. Part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1943-92; Serbia and Montenegro agreed to create a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, changed to Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, and split into Montenegro and Republic of Serbia in 2006.

Table 3. Permissiveness Scores of Electoral Institutions

Type of system	Examples	*Ballot*	*Pool*	*Votes*	*Permissiveness Score*
Closed-list PR	Argentina, Benin, Indonesia, Romania	0	0	0	0.00
Open-list PR 2[a]	Greece, Peru	1	0	1	0.67
Open-list PR 1[b] Factional closed-list PR[c]	Chile Uruguay	1	0	2	1.00
Open-list PR 2 with *candidato nato* clause[d]	Brazil	2	0	1	1.00
SMD with party ballot control, independents disallowed	Bhutan	0	2	1	1.00
Single Transferable Vote with party endorsement	Estonia	1	1	1	1.00
SMD with party ballot control, independents allowed	Albania, Ghana, Grenada, Mongolia	1	2	1	1.33
Block vote[e]	Thailand				
SNTV	Taiwan[f]	1	2	2	1.67
Personal-list PR[g]	Colombia	2	1	2	1.67
SMD plurality with open ballot	Philippines[h]	2	2	2	2.00

Note: Adapted from Johnson and Wallack (2006).
a. Voters cast a single vote for either one party or one candidate, or votes for multiple candidates.
b. Voters cast a single vote for one candidate.
c. Parties submit multiple lists, and voters cast a single vote for one candidate.
d. The *candidato nato* clause guarantees that incumbent legislators appear on a party list for the next election. It was first introduced by a law in 1974 and eliminated in 2002.
e. Voters cast as many votes as there are candidates to be elected from each constituency. The candidates who receive the most votes are elected.
f. SNTV was used in Taiwan until 2004. The actual permissiveness score for the Taiwanese electoral system is less than 1.67 because about 20% of the legislators were elected under closed-list PR.
g. Candidates submit a list, voters cast a single vote for one candidate, and votes are pooled among the candidates on the same list (Carty and Shugart 1995, 429). This Colombian system was changed to closed-list PR in 2003.
h. The actual permissiveness score for the Philippine electoral system is less than 2 since about 20% of the legislators are elected under closed-list PR.

Table 4. Permissiveness Rankings of Electoral Systems in New Democracies

Rank	Permissiveness Score	Examples	Frequency	Percent
1	0.00	Argentina, Benin, Indonesia, Romania	31	32.98
2	0.09	Ecuador	1	1.06
3	0.10	Niger	2	2.13
4	0.48	Georgia	1	1.06
5	0.52	Guatemala (1)	1	1.06
6	0.56	Nepal	1	1.06
7	0.57	Poland	1	1.06
8	0.61	Hungary	1	1.06
9	0.64	Greece	1	1.06
10	0.67	Bulgaria, Peru, Sri Lanka	3	3.19
11	0.80	Mexico	1	1.06
12	0.81	Uganda	1	1.06
13	0.95	Panama	1	1.06
14	1.00	Bhutan, Brazil, Chile, South Korea (2)	13	13.83
15	1.11	Thailand	1	1.06
16	1.30	Taiwan	2	2.13
17	1.33	Albania, Comoros, Ghana, Pakistan	30	31.91
18	1.67	Colombia	1	1.06
19	1.87	The Philippines	1	1.06
Total			94	100

Table 5. Effects of Voter Demands, Old Electoral Institutions, and Party Resources on the Permissiveness Rankings of Electoral Systems in New Democracies

Independent Variable	Slope	Standard Error	z	Statistical Significance
Average voter's socio-economic condition				
Log GDP per capita (base 10) (*log-gdp*: range 2.55-4.21, mean=3.59, sd=.38)	-2.27	1.04	-2.18	0.03
Dominant players in negotiations and old institutions				
Pre-authoritarian + Closed-list PR pre-authoritarian rule (*pre-closedPR0*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.09)	-1.59	.98	-1.62	0.11
Pre-authoritarian + Open-list PR pre-authoritarian rule (*pre-openPR0*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.06)	2.23	1.00	2.24	0.03
Pre-authoritarian + Majoritarian pre-authoritarian rule (*pre-majoritarian0*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.05)	.92	1.04	0.88	0.38
Authoritarian + Open-list PR authoritarian rule (*autho-openPR1*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.03)	2.79	1.52	1.84	0.07
Authoritarian + Majoritarian authoritarian rule (*autho-majoritarian1*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.13)	2.09	.87	2.40	0.02
Authoritarian + Mixed-member authoritarian rule (*autho-mixed1*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.04)	2.24	1.16	1.94	0.05
Incumbent party (*incumbent*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.33)	1.19	.56	2.12	0.03
Controls				
Pre-authoritarian democratic electoral system (*pre-elect*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.49)	.37	.56	0.65	0.52
Authoritarian electoral system (*autho-elect*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.37)	-1.54	.66	-2.32	0.02
Civil war (*cwar*: 0-1 dummy, mean=.11)	-2.44	.86	-2.83	0.01
British colony (bri_col: 0-1 dummy, mean=.19)	.90	.97	0.93	0.35
French colony (fren_col: 0-1 dummy, mean=.11)	.43	1.18	0.37	0.71
Belgian colony (bel_col: 0-1 dummy, mean=.02)	.41	1.13	0.36	0.72
Dutch colony (dut_col: 0-1 dummy, mean=.03)	-2.13	1.76	-1.21	0.23
Log likelihood = -147.48 Likelihood ratio chi-square = 63.38 (p<.01) Pseudo R-square = 0.18				

Note: 1) All estimates are based on 94 observations with world region dummies.

2) Dependent variable is the rankings/order of permissiveness scores, the weighted average of codes for *Ballot*, *Pool*, and *Votes*.

3) Statistical significance is based on two-tailed tests.

Figure 1.1 Expected Probability of Choosing Closed-List Proportional Representation (Permissiveness Rank 1)



Figure 1.2 Expected Probability of Choosing Single-Member District Majoritarian Rules (Permissiveness Rank 17)



Note: Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence intervals.